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Abstract
Solomonoff sequence prediction is a scheme to predict digits of binary strings
without knowing the underlying probability distribution. We call a prediction
scheme informed when it knows the true probability distribution of the sequence.
Several new relations between universal Solomonoff sequence prediction and in-
formed prediction and general probabilistic prediction schemes will be proved.
Among others, they show that the number of errors in Solomonoff prediction is
finite for computable distributions, if finite in the informed case. Deterministic
variants will also be studied. The most interesting result is that the deterministic
variant of Solomonoff prediction is optimal compared to any other probabilistic or
deterministic prediction scheme apart from additive square root corrections only.
This makes it well suited even for difficult prediction problems, where it does not
suffice when the number of errors is minimal to within some factor greater than one.
Solomonoff’s original bound and the ones presented here complement each other in
a useful way.
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1 Introduction
Induction is the process of predicting the future from the past or, more precisely, it is
the process of finding rules in (past) data and using these rules to guess future data.
The induction principle has been subject to long philosophical controversies. Highlights
are Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations, Occams’ razor (simplicity) principle and
Bayes’ rule for conditional probabilities [2]. In 1964, Solomonoff [8] elegantly unified all
these aspects into one formal theory of inductive inference. The theory allows the pre-
diction of digits of binary sequences without knowing their true probability distribution
in contrast to what we call an informed scheme, where the true distribution is known. A
first error estimate was also given by Solomonoff 14 years later in [9]. It states that the
total means squared distance of the prediction probabilities of Solomonoff and informed
prediction is bounded by the Kolmogorov complexity of the true distribution. As a corol-
lary, this theorem ensures that Solomonoff prediction converges to informed prediction for
computable sequences in the limit. This is the key result justifying the use of Solomonoff
prediction for long sequences of low complexity.
Another natural question is to ask for relations between the total number of expected
errors Eξ in Solomonoff prediction and the total number of prediction errors Eµ in the
informed scheme. Unfortunately [9] does not bound Eξ in terms of Eµ in a satisfactory
way. For example it does not exclude the possibility of an infinite Eξ even if Eµ is finite.
Here we want to prove upper bounds to Eξ in terms of Eµ ensuring as a corollary that
the above case cannot happen. On the other hand, our theorem does not say much about
the convergence of Solomonoff to informed prediction. So Solomonoff’s and our bounds
complement each other in a nice way.
In the preliminary Section 2 we give some notations for strings and conditional probability
distributions on strings. Furthermore, we introduce Kolmogorov complexity and the
universal probability, where we take care to make the latter a true probability measure.
In Section 3 we define the general probabilistic prediction scheme (ρ) and Solomonoff (ξ)
and informed (µ) prediction as special cases. We will give several error relations between
these prediction schemes. A bound for the error difference |Eξ−Eµ| between Solomonoff
and informed prediction is the central result. All other relations are then simple, but
interesting consequences or known results such as the Euclidean bound.
In Section 4 we study deterministic variants of Solomonoff (Θξ) and informed (Θµ) pre-
diction. We will give similar error relations as in the probabilistic case between these
prediction schemes. The most interesting consequence is that the Θξ system is opti-
mal compared to any other probabilistic or deterministic prediction scheme apart from
additive square root corrections only.
In the Appendices A, B and C we prove the inequalities (18), (20) and (26), which are
the central parts for the proofs of the Theorems 1 and 2.
For an excellent introduction to Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff induction one
should consult the book of Li and Vita´nyi [7] or the article [6] for a short course. Historical
surveys of inductive reasoning/inference can be found in [1, 10].
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2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper we will consider binary sequences/strings and conditional proba-
bility measures on strings.
We will denote strings over the binary alphabet {0, 1} by s= x1x2...xn with xk ∈ {0, 1}
and their lengths with l(s)=n. ǫ is the empty string, xn:m := xnxn+1...xm−1xm for n ≤ m
and ǫ for n > m. Furthermore, x<n := x1...xn−1.
We use Greek letters for probability measures and underline their arguments to indicate
that they are probability arguments. Let ρn(x1...xn) be the probability that an (infinite)
sequence starts with x1...xn. We drop the index on ρ if it is clear from its arguments:∑
xn∈{0,1}
ρ(x1:n) =
∑
xn
ρn(x1:n) = ρn−1(x<n) = ρ(x<n), ρ(ǫ) = ρ0(ǫ) = 1. (1)
We also need conditional probabilities derived from Bayes’ rule. We prefer a notation
which preserves the order of the words in contrast to the standard notation ρ(·|·) which
flips it. We extend the definition of ρ to the conditional case with the following convention
for its arguments: An underlined argument xk is a probability variable and other non-
underlined arguments xk represent conditions. With this convention, Bayes’ rule has the
following look:
ρ(x<nxn) = ρ(x1:n)/ρ(x<n) and
ρ(x1...xn) = ρ(x1)·ρ(x1x2)·...·ρ(x1...xn−1xn).
(2)
The first equation states that the probability that a string x1...xn−1 is followed by xn is
equal to the probability that a string starts with x1...xn divided by the probability that
a string starts with x1...xn−1. The second equation is the first, applied n times.
Let us choose some universal monotone Turing machine U with unidirectional input and
output tapes and a bidirectional work tape. We can then define the prefix Kolmogorov
complexity [3, 5] as the length of the shortest program p, for which U outputs string s:
K(s) := min
p
{l(p) : U(p) = s}. (3)
The universal semi-measure M(s) is defined as the probability that the output of the
universal Turing machine U starts with s when provided with fair coin flips on the input
tape. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to the formal definition
M(s) :=
∑
p : ∃ω:U(p)=sω
2−l(p), (4)
where the sum is over minimal programs p for which U outputs a string starting with
s. U might be non-terminating. M has the important universality property [12] that it
majorizes every computable probability measure ρ up to a multiplicative factor depending
only on ρ but not on s:
ρ(s) ≤ 2K(ρ)+O(1)M(s). (5)
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The Kolmogorov complexity of a function like ρ is defined as the length of the shortest
self-delimiting coding of a Turing machine computing this function. Unfortunately M
itself is not a probability measure on the binary strings. We have M(s0)+M(s1)<M(s)
because there are programs p which output just s, followed neither by 0 nor by 1; they
just stop after printing s or continue forever without any further output. This drawback
can easily be corrected1[9]. Let us define the universal probability measure ξ by defining
first the conditional probabilities
ξ(sx) :=
M(sx)
M(s0) +M(s1)
, x ∈ {0, 1} , ξ(ǫ) := 1 (6)
and then by using (2) to get ξ(x1...xn). It is easily verified by induction that ξ is indeed
a probability measures and universal
ρ(s) ≤ 2K(ρ)+O(1)ξ(s). (7)
The latter follows from ξ(s) ≥M(s) and (5). The universality property (7) is all we need
to know about ξ in the following.
3 Probabilistic Sequence Prediction
Every inductive inference problem can be brought into the following form: Given a string
x, give a guess for its continuation y. We will assume that the strings which have to be
continued are drawn according to a probability distribution2. In this section we consider
probabilistic predictors of the next bit of a string. So let µ(x1...xn) be the true probability
measure of string x1:n, xk∈{0, 1} and ρ(x<nxn) be the probability that the system predicts
xn as the successor of x1...xn−1. We are not interested here in the probability of the next
bit itself. We want our system to output either 0 or 1. Probabilistic strategies are useful
in game theory where they are called mixed strategies. We keep µ fixed and compare
different ρ. Interesting quantities are the probability of making an error when predicting
xn, given x<n. If xn = 0, the probability of our system to predict 1 (making an error) is
ρ(x<n1)=1−ρ(x<n0). That xn is 0 happens with probability µ(x<n0). Analogously for
0↔1. So the probability of making a wrong prediction in the nth step (x<n fixed) is
enρ(x<n) :=
∑
xn∈{0,1}
µ(x<nxn)[1− ρ(x<nxn)]. (8)
The total µ-expected number of errors in the first n predictions is
Enρ :=
n∑
k=1
∑
x1...xk−1
µ(x<k)·ekρ(x<k). (9)
1 Another popular way is to keepM and sacrifice some of the axioms of probability theory. The reason
for doing this is that M , although not computable [7, 9], is at least enumerable. On the other hand, we
are interested in conditional probabilities, derived from M , which are no longer enumerable anyway, so
there is no reason for us to stick to M . ξ is still computable in the limit or approximable.
2This probability measure µ might be 1 for some sequence x1:∞ and 0 for all others. In this case,
K(µn) is equal to K(x1:n) (up to terms of order 1).
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If µ is known, a natural choice for ρ is ρ = µ. This is what we call an informed prediction
scheme. If the probability of xn is high (low), the system predicts xn with high (low)
probability. If µ is unknown, one could try the universal distribution ξ for ρ as defined in
(4) and (6). This is known as Solomonoff prediction [8].
What we are most interested in is an upper bound for the µ-expected number of errors
Enξ of the ξ-predictor. One might also be interested in the probability difference of
predictions at step n of the µ- and ξ-predictor or the total absolute difference to some
power α (α-norm in n-space).
dαk (x<k) :=
∑
xk
µ(x<kxk)·
∣∣∣ξ(x<kxk)− µ(x<kxk)∣∣∣α = ∣∣∣ξ(x<k0)− µ(x<k0)∣∣∣α
∆(α)n :=
n∑
k=1
∑
x<k
µ(x<k)·d
α
k(x<k), α = 1, 2 (10)
For α=2 there is the well known-result [9]
∆(2)n <
1
2
ln 2·K(µ)<∞ for computable µ. (11)
One reason to directly study relations between Enξ and Enµ is that from (11) alone it
does not follow that E∞ξ is finite, if E∞µ is finite. Assume that we could choose µ
such that enµ ∼ 1/n
2 and enξ ∼ 1/n. Then E∞µ would be finite, but E∞ξ would be
infinite, without violating (11). There are other theorems, the most prominent being
ξ(x<nxn)/µ(x<nxn)
n→∞
−→ 1 with µ probability 1 (see [7] page 332). However, neither of
them settles the above question. In the following we will show that a finite E∞µ causes a
finite E∞ξ.
Let us define the Kullback Leibler distance [4] or relative entropy between µ and ξ:
hn(x<n) :=
∑
xn
µ(x<nxn) ln
µ(x<nxn)
ξ(x<nxn)
. (12)
Hn is then defined as the sum-expectation for which the following can be shown [9]
Hn :=
n∑
k=1
∑
x<k
µ(x<k)·hk(x<k) =
n∑
k=1
∑
x1:k
µ(x1:k) ln
µ(x<kxk)
ξ(x<kxk)
= (13)
=
∑
x1:n
µ(x1:n) ln
n∏
k=1
µ(x<kxk)
ξ(x<kxk)
=
∑
x1:n
µ(x1:n) ln
µ(x1:n)
ξ(x1:n)
< ln 2·K(µn) +O(1)
In the first line we have inserted (12) and used Bayes rule µ(x<k)·µ(x<kxk)=µ(x1:k). Due
to (1) we can replace
∑
x1:k µ(x1:k) by
∑
x1:n µ(x1:n) as the argument of the logarithm is
independent of xk+1:n. The k sum can now be exchanged with the x1:n sum and transforms
to a product inside the logarithm. In the last equality we have used the second form
of Bayes rule (2) for µ and ξ. If we use universality (7) of ξ, i.e. lnµ(x1:n)/ξ(x1:n) <
ln 2 ·K(µn)+O(1), the final inequality in (13) is yielded, which is the basis of all error
estimates.
We now come to our first theorem:
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Theorem 1. Let there be binary sequences x1x2... drawn with probability µn(x1:n) for
the first n bits. A ρ-system predicts by definition xn from x<n with probability ρ(x<nxn).
enρ(x<n) is the error probability in the n
th prediction (8) and Enρ is the µ-expected total
number of errors in the first n predictions (9). The following error relations hold between
universal Solomonoff (ρ = ξ), informed (ρ = µ) and general (ρ) predictions:
i) |Enξ − Enµ| ≤ ∆
(1)
n < Hn +
√
2EnµHn
ii) ∆(2)n ≤
1
2
Hn
iii) Enξ > ∆
(2)
n +
1
2
Enµ
iv) Enξ > Enµ +Hn −
√
2EnµHn > Hn for Enµ>2Hn
v) Enµ ≤ 2Enρ , enµ ≤ 2enρ for any ρ
vi) Enξ < 2Enρ +Hn +
√
4EnρHn for any ρ,
where Hn < ln 2 ·K(µ)+O(1) is the relative entropy (13) and K(µ) is the Kolmogorov
complexity of µ (3).
Corollary 1. For computable µ, i.e. for K(µ) <∞, the following statements immedi-
ately follow from Theorem 1:
vii) if E∞µ is finite, then E∞ξ is finite
viii) Enξ/Enµ = 1 +O(E
−1/2
nµ )
Enµ→∞
−→ 1
ix) Enξ − Enµ = O(
√
Enµ)
x) Enξ/Enρ ≤ 2 +O(E
−1/2
nρ ).
Relation (i) is the central new result. It is best illustrated for computable µ by the
corollary. Statements (vii), (viii) and (ix) follow directly from (i) and the finiteness of
H∞. Statement (x) follows from (vi).
First of all, (vii) ensures finiteness of the number of errors of Solomonoff prediction,
if the informed prediction makes only a finite number of errors. This is especially the
case for deterministic µ, as Enµ = 0 in this case
3. Solomonoff prediction makes only
a finite number of errors on computable sequences. For more complicated probabilistic
environments, where even the ideal informed system makes an infinite number of errors,
(ix) ensures that the error excess of Solomonoff prediction is only of order
√
Enµ. This
ensures that the error densities En/n of both systems converge to each other, but (ix)
actually says more than this. It ensures that the quotient converges to 1 and also gives
the speed of convergence (viii).
Relation (ii) is the well-known Euclidean bound [9]. It is the only upper bound in Theorem
1 which remains finite for Enµ/ρ→∞. It ensures convergence of the individual prediction
probabilities ξ(x<nxn)→µ(x<nxn). Relation (iii) shows that the ξ system makes at least
half of the errors of the µ system. Relation (iv) improves the lower bounds of (i) and (iii).
Together with the upper bound in (i) it says that the excess of ξ errors as compared to µ
3We call a probability measure deterministic if it is 1 for exactly one sequence and 0 for all others.
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errors is given by Hn apart from O(
√
EnµHn) corrections. The excess is neither smaller
nor larger. This result is plausible, since knowing µ means additional information, which
saves making some of the errors. The information content of µ (relative to ξ) is quantified
in terms of the relative entropy Hn.
Relation (v) states that no prediction scheme can have less than half of the errors of
the µ system, whatever we take for ρ. This ensures the optimality of µ apart from a
factor of 2. Combining this with (i) ensures optimality of Solomonoff prediction, apart
from a factor of 2 and additive (inverse) square root corrections (vi), (x). Note that
even when comparing ξ with ρ, the computability of µ is what counts, whereas ρ might
be any, even an uncomputable, probabilistic predictor. The optimality within a factor
of 2 might be sufficient for some applications, especially for finite E∞µ or if Enµ/n→ 0,
but is inacceptable for others. More about this in the next section, where we consider
deterministic prediction, where no factor 2 occurs.
Proof of Theorem 1. The first inequality in (i) follows directly from the definition of En
and ∆n and the triangle inequality. For the second inequality, let us start more modestly
and try to find constants A and B which satisfy the linear inequality
∆(1)n < A·Enµ +B ·Hn (14)
If we could show
dk(x<k) < A·ekµ(x<k) +B ·hk(x<k) (15)
for all k ≤ n and all x<k, (14) would follow immediately by summation and the definition
of ∆n, En and Hn. With k, x<k, µ, ξ fixed now, we abbreviate
y := µ(x<k1) , 1− y = µ(x<k0)
z := ξ(x<k1) , 1− z = ξ(x<k0)
r := ρ(x<k1) , 1− r = ρ(x<k0).
(16)
The various error functions can then be expressed by y, z and r
ekµ = 2y(1− y)
ekξ = y(1− z) + (1− y)z
ekρ = y(1− r) + (1− y)r
dk = |y − z|
hk = y ln
y
z
+ (1− y) ln 1−y
1−z
.
(17)
Inserting this into (15) we get
|y − z| < A·2y(1− y) +B ·
[
y ln
y
z
+ (1− y) ln
1− y
1− z
]
. (18)
In Appendix A we will show that this inequality is true for B≥ 1
2A
+1, A>0. Inequality
(14) therefore holds for any A>0, provided we insert B= 1
2A
+1. Thus we might minimize
the r.h.s of (14) w.r.t A. The minimum is at A =
√
Hn/2Enµ leading to the upper bound
∆(1)n < Hn +
√
2EnµHn
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which completes the proof of (i).
Bound (ii) is well known [9]. It is already linear and is proved by showing d2n ≤
1
2
hn.
Inserting the abbreviations (17) we get
2(y − z)2 ≤ y ln
y
z
+ (1− y) ln
1− y
1− z
(19)
This lower bound for the Kullback Leibler distance is well known [4].
Relation (iii) does not involve Hn at all and is elementary. It is reduced to enξ>d
2
n+
1
2
enµ,
equivalent to z(1− y) + y(1− z) > (y − z)2 + y(1− y), equivalent to z(1− z) > 0, which
is obviously true.
The second inequality of (iv) is trivial and the first is proved similarly to (i). Again we
start with a linear inequality −Enξ< (A − 1)Enµ + (B − 1)Hn, which is further reduced
to −ekξ<(A− 1)ekµ + (B − 1)hk. Inserting the abbreviations (17) we get
− y(1− z)− z(1 − y) < (A− 1)2y(1− y) + (B − 1)
[
y ln
y
z
+ (1− y) ln
1− y
1− z
]
. (20)
In Appendix B this inequality is shown to hold for 2AB ≥ 1, when B > 1. If we insert
B = 1/2A and minimize w.r.t. A, the minimum is again at A =
√
Hn/2Enµ leading to the
upper bound −Enξ ≤−Enµ − Hn +
√
2EnµHn restricted to Enµ> 2Hn, which completes
the proof of (iv).
Statement (v) is satisfied because 2y(1− y) ≤ 2[y(1− r) + (1− y)r]. Statement (vi) is a
direct consequence of (i) and (v). This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ⊓⊔
4 Deterministic Sequence Prediction
In the last section several relations were derived between the number of errors of the
universal ξ-system, the informed µ-system and arbitrary ρ-systems. All of them were
probabilistic predictors in the sense that given x<n they output 0 or 1 with certain prob-
abilities. In this section, we are interested in systems whose output on input x<n is
deterministically 0 or 1. Again we can distinguish between the case where the true dis-
tribution µ is known or unknown. In the probabilistic scheme we studied the µ and the
ξ system. Given any probabilistic predictor ρ it is easy to construct a deterministic pre-
dictor Θρ from it in the following way: If the probability of predicting 0 is larger than
1
2
,
the deterministic predictor always chooses 0. Analogously for 0↔1. We define4
Θρ(x<nxn) := Θ(ρ(x<nxn)−
1
2
) :=
{
0 for ρ(x<nxn) <
1
2
1 for ρ(x<nxn) >
1
2
.
Note that every deterministic predictor can be written in the form Θρ for some ρ and that
although Θρ(x1...xn), defined via Bayes’ rule (2), takes only values in {0, 1}, it may still
4All results will be independent of the choice for ρ = 1
2
, so one might choose 0 for definiteness.
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be interpreted as a probability measure. Deterministic prediction is just a special case of
probabilistic prediction. The two models Θµ and Θξ will be studied now.
Analogously to the last section we draw binary strings randomly with distribution µ and
define the probability that the Θρ system makes an erroneous prediction in the n
th step
and the total µ-expected number of errors in the first n predictions as
enΘρ(x<n) :=
∑
xn
µ(x<nxn)[1−Θρ(x<nxn)]
EnΘρ :=
n∑
k=1
∑
x<k
µ(x<k)·ekΘρ(x<k).
(21)
The definitions (12) and (13) of hn and Hn remain unchanged (ξ is not replaced by Θξ).
The following relations will be derived:
Theorem 2. Let there be binary sequences drawn with probability µn(x1:n) for the first
n bits. A ρ-system predicts by definition xn from x<n with probability ρ(x<nxn). A
deterministic system Θρ always predicts 1 if ρ(x<nxn)>
1
2
and 0 otherwise. If enρ(x<n) is
the error probability in the nth prediction, Enρ the total µ-expected number of errors in
the first n predictions (9), the following relations hold:
i) 0 ≤ EnΘξ −EnΘµ =
∑
xk µ(x<k)|enΘξ − enΘµ| < Hn +
√
4EnΘµHn +H
2
n
ii) EnΘµ ≤ Enρ , enΘµ ≤ enρ for any ρ
iii) EnΘξ < Enρ +Hn +
√
4EnρHn +H2n for any ρ,
where Hn< ln 2 ·K(µ)+O(1) is the relative entropy (13), which is finite for computable
µ.
No other useful bounds have been found, especially no bounds for the analogue of ∆n.
Corollary 2. For computable µ, i.e. for K(µ) <∞, the following statements immedi-
ately follow from Theorem 2:
vii) if E∞Θµ is finite, then E∞Θξ is finite
viii) EnΘξ/EnΘµ = 1 +O(E
−1/2
nΘµ ) −→ 1 for EnΘµ →∞
ix) EnΘξ − EnΘµ = O(
√
EnΘµ)
x) EnΘξ/Enρ ≤ 1 +O(E
−1/2
nρ ).
Most of what we said in the probabilistic case remains valid here, as the Theorems and
Corollaries 1 and 2 parallel each other. For this reason we will only highlight the differ-
ences.
The last inequality of (i) is the central new result in the deterministic case. Again, it is
illustrated in the corollary, which follows trivially from Theorem 2.
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From (ii) we see that Θµ is the best prediction scheme possible, compared to any other
probabilistic or deterministic prediction ρ. The error expectation enΘµ is smaller in every
single step and hence, the total number of errors are also. This itself is not surprising and
nearly obvious, as the Θµ system always predicts the bit of highest probability. So, for
known µ, the Θµ system should always be preferred to any other prediction scheme, even
to the informed µ prediction system.
Combining (i) and (ii) leads to a bound (iii) on the number of prediction errors of the
deterministic variant of Solomonoff prediction. For computable µ, no prediction scheme
can have fewer errors than that of the Θξ system, whatever we take for ρ, apart from
some additive correction of order
√
EnΘµ . No factor 2 occurs as in the probabilistic
case. Together with the quick convergence E−1/2nρ stated in (x), the Θξ model should be
sufficiently good in many applications.
Example. Let us consider a critical example. We want to predict the outcome of a die
colored black (=0) and white (=1). Two faces should be white and the other 4 should be
black. The game becomes more interesting by having a second complementary die with
two black and four white sides. The dealer who throws the dice uses one or the other die
according to some deterministic rule. The stake s is $3 in every round; our return r is $5
for every correct prediction.
The coloring of the dice and the selection strategy of the dealer unambiguously determine
µ. µ(x<n0) is
2
3
for die 1 or 1
3
for die 2. If we use ρ for prediction, we will have made Enρ
incorrect and n − Enρ correct predictions in the first n rounds. The expected profit will
be
Pnρ := (n− Enρ)r − ns = (2n− 5Enρ)$. (22)
The winning threshold Pnρ>0 is reached if Enρ/n<1−s/r=
2
5
.
If we knew µ, we could use the best possible prediction scheme Θµ. The error (21) and
profit (22) expectations per round in this case are
eΘµ := enΘµ(x<n) =
1
3
=
EnΘµ
n
<
2
5
,
PnΘµ
n
=
1
3
$ > 0 (23)
so we can make money from this game. If we predict according to the probabilistic µ
prediction scheme (8) we would lose money in the long run:
enµ(x<n) = 2·
1
3
·
2
3
=
4
9
=
Enµ
n
>
2
5
,
Pnµ
n
= −
2
9
$ < 0
In the more interesting case where we do not know µ we can use Solomonoff prediction ξ
or its deterministic variant Θξ. From (viii) of Corollaries 1 and 2 we know that
Pnξ/Pnµ = 1 +O(n
−1/2) = PnΘξ/PnΘµ ,
so asymptotically the ξ system provides the same profit as the µ system and the Θξ system
the same as the Θµ system. Using the ξ system is a losing strategy, while using the Θξ
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system is a winning strategy. Let us estimate the number of rounds we have to play before
reaching the winning zone with the Θξ system. PnΘξ>0 if EnΘξ<(1−s/r)n if
EnΘµ +Hn +
√
4EnΘµHn +H
2
n < (1− s/r)·n
by Theorem 2 (i). Solving w.r.t. Hn we get
Hn <
(1− s/r −EnΘµ/n)
2
2·(1− s/r + EnΘµ/n)
· n.
Using Hn< ln 2·K(µ)+O(1) and (23) we expect to be in the winning zone for
n >
2·(1− s/r + eΘµ)
(1− s/r − eΘµ)
2
·ln 2·K(µ) +O(1) = 330 ln 2·K(µ) +O(1).
If the die selection strategy reflected in µ is not too complicated, the Θξ prediction system
reaches the winning zone after a few thousand rounds. The number of rounds is not
really small because the expected profit per round is one order of magnitude smaller than
the return. This leads to a constant of two orders of magnitude size in front of K(µ).
Stated otherwise, it is due to the large stochastic noise, which makes it difficult to extract
the signal, i.e. the structure of the rule µ. Furthermore, this is only a bound for the
turnaround value of n. The true expected turnaround n might be smaller.
However, every game for which there exists a winning strategy ρ with Pnρ ∼ n, Θξ is
guaranteed to get into the winning zone for some n∼K(µ), i.e. PnΘξ > 0 for sufficiently
large n. This is not guaranteed for the ξ-system, due to the factor 2 in the bound (x) of
Corollary 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. The method of proof is the same as in the previous section, so we
will keep it short. With the abbreviations (16) we can write ekΘξ and ekΘµ in the forms
ekΘξ = y(1−Θ(z −
1
2
)) + (1− y)Θ(z − 1
2
) = |y −Θ(z − 1
2
)|
ekΘµ = y(1−Θ(y −
1
2
)) + (1− y)Θ(y − 1
2
) = min{y, 1− y}.
(24)
With these abbreviations, (ii) is equivalent to min{y, 1−y}≤y(1− r)+(1−y)r, which is
true, because the minimum of two numbers is always smaller than their weighted average.
The first inequality and equality of (i) follow directly from (ii). To prove the last inequal-
ity, we start once again with a linear model
EnΘξ < (A+ 1)EnΘµ + (B + 1)Hn. (25)
Inserting the definition of En and Hn, using (24), and omitting the sums we have to find
A and B, which satisfy
|y −Θ(z − 1
2
)| < (A+ 1)min{y, 1− y}+ (B + 1)
[
y ln
y
z
+ (1− y) ln
1− y
1− z
]
. (26)
In Appendix C we will show that the inequality is satisfied for B≥ 1
4
A + 1
A
and A > 0.
Inserting B= 1
4
A+ 1
A
into (25) and minimizing the r.h.s. w.r.t. A, we get the upper bound
EnΘξ < EnΘµ +Hn +
√
4EnµHn +H2n for A
2 =
Hn
EnΘµ +
1
4
Hn
.
Statement (iii) is a direct consequence of (i) and (ii). This completes the proof of Theorem
2. ⊓⊔
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5 Conclusions
We have proved several new error bounds for Solomonoff prediction in terms of informed
prediction and in terms of general prediction schemes. Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 sum-
marize the results in the probabilistic case and Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 for the deter-
ministic case. We have shown that in the probabilistic case Enξ is asymptotically bounded
by twice the number of errors of any other prediction scheme. In the deterministic variant
of Solomonoff prediction this factor 2 is absent. It is well suited, even for difficult predic-
tion problems, as the error probability EΘξ/n converges rapidly to that of the minimal
possible error probability EΘµ/n.
Acknowledgments: I thank Ray Solomonoff and Ju¨rgen Schmidhuber for proofreading
this work and for numerous discussions.
A Proof of Inequality (18)
5With the definition
f(y, z;A,B) := A·2y(1− y) +B ·
[
y ln
y
z
+ (1− y) ln
1− y
1− z
]
− |y − z|
we have to show f(y, z;A,B)> 0 for 0< y < 1, 0< z < 1 and suitable A and B. We do
this by showing that f > 0 at all extremal values, ‘at’ boundaries and at non-analytical
points. f→+∞ for z → 0/1, if we choose B > 0. Moreover, at the non-analytic point
z = y we have f(y, y;A,B) = 2Ay(1−y)≥0 for A≥0. The extremal condition ∂f/∂z=0
for z 6=y (keeping y fixed) leads to
y = y∗ := z ·[1−
s
B
(1− z)], s := sign(z − y) = ±1.
Inserting y∗ into the definition of f and omitting the positive term B[. . .], we get
f(y∗, z;A,B) > 2Ay∗(1− y∗)− |z − y∗| = 1
B2
z(1 − z)·g(z;A,B)
g(z;A,B) := 2A(B − s(1− z))(B + sz)− sB.
We have reduced the problem to showing g ≥ 0. Since s = ±1, we have g(z;A,B) >
2A(B − 1 + z)(B − z) − B for B > 1. The latter is quadratic in z and symmetric in
z ↔ 1 − z with a maximum at 1
2
. Thus it is sufficient to check the boundary values
g(0;A,B) = g(1;A,B) = 2A(B − 1)B − B. They are non-negative for 2A(B − 1) ≥ 1.
Putting everything together, we have proved that f >0 for B≥ 1
2A
+ 1 and A>0. ⊓⊔
5The proofs are a bit sketchy. We will be a little sloppy about boundary values y = 0/1, z = 1
2
, Θ(0),
≥ versus >, and approaching versus at the boundary. All subtleties have been checked and do not spoil
the results. As 0<ξ<1, therefore 0<z<1 is strict.
MARCUS HUTTER, TECHNICAL REPORT, IDSIA-11-10 12
B Proof of Inequality (20)
The proof of this inequality is similar to the previous one. With the definition
f(y, z;A,B) := (A−1)2y(1−y)+(B−1)
[
y ln
y
z
+ (1− y) ln
1− y
1− z
]
+y(1−z)+z(1−y)
we have to show f(y, z;A,B)>0 for 0<y<1, 0<z<1 and suitable A and B. Again, we
do this by showing that f >0 at all extremal values and ‘at’ the boundary. f→+∞ for
z → 0, 1, if we choose B > 1. The extremal condition ∂f/∂z=0 (keeping y fixed) leads
to
y = y∗ := z ·
z − B
1− B − 2z(1− z)
, 0 < y∗ < 1.
Inserting y∗ into the definition of f and omitting the positive term (B − 1)[. . .], we get
f(y∗, z;A,B) > 2Ay∗(1− y∗)− (2y∗ − 1)(z − y∗) = z(1−z)
[1−B−2z(1−z)]2
·g(z;A,B)
g(z;A,B) := 2A(z − B)(1− z − B)− (B − 1)(2z − 1)2.
We have reduced the problem to showing g≥0. This is easy, since g is quadratic in z and
symmetric in z↔1− z. The extremal value g(1
2
;A,B)=2A(B − 1
2
)2 is positive for A>0.
The boundary values g(0;A,B)=g(1;A,B)=(2AB − 1)(B − 1) are ≥ 0 for 2AB ≥ 1.
Putting everything together, we have proved that f >0 for 2AB≥1 and B>1. ⊓⊔
C Proof of Inequality (26)
We want to show that
|y −Θ(z − 1
2
)| < (A+ 1)min{y, 1− y}+ (B + 1)
[
y ln y
z
+ (1− y) ln 1−y
1−z
]
The formula is symmetric w.r.t. y↔1−y and z↔1−z simultaneously, so we can restrict
ourselves to 0<y<1 and 0<z< 1
2
. Furthermore, let B>−1. Using (19), it is enough to
prove
f(y, z;A,B) := (A+ 1)min{y, 1− y}+ (B + 1)2(y − z)2 − y > 0
f is quadratic in z; thus for y < 1
2
it takes its minimum at z = y. Since f(y, y;A,B) =
Ay > 0 for A > 0, we can concentrate on the case y ≥ 1
2
. In this case, the minimum is
reached at the boundary z = 1
2
.
f(y, 1
2
;A,B) = (A+ 1)(1− y) + (B + 1)2(y − 1
2
)2 − y
This is now quadratic in y with minimum at
y∗ =
A+ 2B + 4
4(B + 1)
, f(y∗, 1
2
;A,B) =
4AB − A2 − 4
8(B + 1)
≥ 0
for B ≥ 1
4
A+ 1
A
, A > 0, (⇒ B ≥ 1). ⊓⊔
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